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THE UNSPECIFIED SPECIFICITY OF 
SPORT: A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE’S 
TREATMENT OF THE SPECIFICITY OF 
SPORT 
uropean football is among the world leaders in revenue 
generation. 1  Despite this perceived success, due to a 
combination of inflated wages, large cash transfer fees, and 
pressure from supporters to compete and succeed at the high-
est levels, football clubs often spend far more than the revenue 
they bring in.2 In response to the financial frailty among foot-
ball clubs across Europe, the Union des Associations Eu-
ropéennes de Football (“UEFA”)3 promulgated a set of rules 
called the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regu-
lations (“Financial Fair Play” or “FFP”).4 
The purpose of these regulations is to, inter alia, “improve 
the economic and financial capability of the clubs”5 and to “in-
troduce more discipline and rationality in club football financ-
es.”6 
                                                                                                             
 1. For example, the Barclay’s Premier League, England’s top division of 
football, generated revenue of €2.5 billion in the 2010–2011 season. Annual 
Review of Football Finance 2012, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/assets/ 
Dcom-UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports 
%20Business%20Group/uk-sbg-annual-football-finance-review-2012-
highlights.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 2. See, e.g., Premier League Clubs Boast £3.1 Billion in Debt, GUARDIAN 
(June 2, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/ jun/03/english-
premier-league-debt. 
 3. Unlike most sports organizations in the United States, the Union des 
Associations Européennes de Football is not commonly referred to as “the 
UEFA,” but rather called “UEFA.” See, e.g., About UEFA—Overview, UEFA, 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisation/history/index.html (last 
updated May 25, 2013) [hereinafter About UEFA—Overview]. 
 4. UEFA, UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS 
(2012), available at http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/ 
Tech/uefaorg/General/01/80/54/10/1805410_DOWNLOAD.pdf [hereinafter 
UEFA CLUB LICENSING REGULATIONS]. 
 5. Id. art. 2(2)(a). 
 6. Id. art. 2(2)(c). 
E
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However, since UEFA approved the Financial Fair Play regu-
lations in 2010,7 there has been vast speculation as to their 
compatibility with European Union law, including the right to 
free movement and competition law.8 This speculation stems 
from uncertainty about the amount of power conferred upon 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”) to evalu-
ate sporting claims, and the Court’s consistent findings that 
sporting rules or regulations are incompatible with EU law.9 
EU law is based on various treaties developed over the course 
of sixty years.10 The applicable treaty today is the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“Treaty” or “TFEU”).11 
While many provisions of the treaties have changed over the 
EU’s long history, the provisions relating to sports governance 
have remained substantively the same, with the exception of 
their numbering.12 
In the ECJ’s first ruling on sports governance, Walrave v. As-
sociation Union Internationale,13 the Court declared that the 
“practice of sport is subject to [EU] law only in so far as it con-
stitutes an economic activity within the meaning of . . . the 
Treaty.” 14  Since the decision, while European courts have 
                                                                                                             
 7. Financial Fair Play, UEFA, 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay 
(last visited May 20, 2013). 
 8. See, e.g., Johan Lindholm, The Problem with Salary Caps under Euro-
pean Union Law: The Case Against Financial Fair Play, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 189 (2011). 
 9. Richard Parrish, Reconciling Conflicting Approaches to Sport in the 
European Union, in PROFESSIONAL SPORT IN THE EU: REGULATION AND RE-
REGULATION 21 (2000) [hereinafter Parrish, Reconciling Conflicting Ap-
proaches]. 
 10. Timeline of the European Union, EUROPEAN INST. (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.europeaninstitute.org/EU-Facts/timeline-of-the-european-
union.html. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Therefore, even though European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decisions 
refer to the article numbers in effect at the time of the decision, this Note will 
refer to the applicable article numbers of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“Treaty” or “TFEU”). For example, in Dona v. Mantero, de-
cided in 1976, the ECJ discussed the free movement of workers provision as 
Article 48. Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, para. 39. Under 
the TFEU, the free movement of workers provision is Article 45. This Note 
will use Article 45 to refer to that provision. 
 13. Case 36/74, Walrave v. Ass’n Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 
E.C.R. 1405. 
 14. Id. para. 4. 
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acknowledged the potential of a “‘sporting exception’ in which 
rules of purely sporting interest were removed from the scope 
of the Treaty,”15 they have struggled to separate pure sporting 
rules from non-exempt areas of law such as competition, free 
movement of workers, and other treaty provisions.16 As a result 
of this struggle, the ECJ has often found that sporting rules are 
incompatible with the Treaty based on the principle of propor-
tionality, which “requires that action undertaken must be pro-
portionate to its objectives,”17 even though it found that the ob-
jectives of the regulations were legitimate based on social or 
public interests.18 
Using a challenge to the Financial Fair Play regulations as a 
paradigm of how the Court would analyze a challenge to sports 
regulation, this Note argues that the ECJ’s strict use of the 
principle of proportionality does not take into account the spec-
ificity of sport19 that the ECJ itself established, resulting in 
overregulation.20 Therefore, in order to account for the unique 
nature of sports regulation, such as the preservation of equal 
competition and interdependence among competitors, the ECJ 
should first determine whether the regulations in question af-
                                                                                                             
 15. RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 1 (2008). 
 16. See Dona, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, para. 12 (challenging rules under free 
movement and nationality discrimination provisions). 
 17. TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136 (2d ed. 2006). 
 18. See Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Bernard, 2010 ECJ 
EUR-Lex LEXIS 113 (Mar. 16, 2010) (encouragement, recruitment, and 
training of young players can justify a restriction); Case C-415/93, Union 
Royal Belge de Societes de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman (Bosman), 
1995 E.C.R. I-4921 (maintaining a competitive balance and encouraging re-
cruitment and training of young players can justify a restriction). 
 19. “For several years now, both politicians and legal scholars have dis-
cussed the much vexed question of the so-called ‘sporting exception’ to Euro-
pean Union law, sometimes referred to as the ‘specificity of sport.’” Gianni 
Infantino, Meca-Medina: A Step Backwards for the European Sports Model 
and the Specificity of Sport, UEFA (Feb. 10, 2006), 
http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/480391_DOW
NLOAD.pdf. 
 20. While throughout the sporting cases presented to the ECJ, the Court 
consistently found that the goals of the rules in question were legitimate, the 
principle of proportionality left the Court with little choice but to find the 
rules incompatible with the Treaty. See, e.g., Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921. 
But see Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991. 
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fect a fundamental right21 or a non-fundamental right.22 Be-
cause fundamental rights warrant the use of strict proportion-
ality, the ECJ’s analysis of these challenges should remain the 
same. However, when non-fundamental rights are involved, the 
Court should apply a less exacting, or “non-fundamental” pro-
portionality test, which would lead to a finding that certain 
practices comply with the Treaty even though those practices 
would not meet the standard of proportionality currently ap-
plied by the ECJ. 
Part I will discuss the basic structure of UEFA, the Financial 
Fair Play regulations, and the development of EU sports law. 
Part II will apply current EU sports law to Financial Fair Play 
and show that a strict application of the principle of propor-
tionality would lead to a finding that the regulations are in-
compatible with the Treaty. Part III will propose a new ap-
proach where the ECJ would first distinguish between funda-
mental and non-fundamental EU rights, and then apply a low-
er proportionality standard to non-fundamental rights in order 
to grant sporting organizations the deference required for effi-
cient internal regulation. 
I. UEFA, FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
EUROPEAN UNION SPORTS LAW  
UEFA is “one of six continental confederations of world foot-
ball’s governing body, [Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (“FIFA”)].”23 As the continental confederation for 
Europe, UEFA grants licenses to national football associations 
and clubs24 and is currently comprised of fifty-three European 
members. 25 In addition to “fostering and develop[ing] unity and 
                                                                                                             
 21. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 22. Id. 
 23. About UEFA—Overview, supra note 3; see also The Organisation, 
FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/index.html (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2013). 
 24. An example of a national football association is England’s aptly named 
“Football Association” or “The FA.” The FA’s duties include “promoting the 
development of [football], . . . regulating the game on and off the field, . . . 
sanctioning all matches, leagues and competitions played in England, . . . 
[and] organizing . . . national competitions.” About the Football Association—
The FA Strategic Plan 2011–2015, THE FA, http://www.thefa.com/about-
football-association/strategy (last visited May 20, 2013). 
 25. About UEFA—Overview, supra note 3; UEFA CLUB LICENSING 
REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 5. 
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solidarity among the European football community,”26 UEFA 
hosts the most prestigious and lucrative club tournaments in 
world football.27 Only licensed clubs from member associations 
can participate in these tournaments, and because compliance 
with UEFA regulations is required to obtain a license, the fi-
nancial incentive to comply is too high for most clubs to risk 
non-compliance.28 
UEFA enacted its Financial Fair Play regulations in response 
to “repeated, and worsening, financial loses” among football 
clubs.29 The federation’s fears were not unfounded; between the 
approval of FFP in 2010 and its implementation in 2012,30 as 
many as ten clubs declared bankruptcy due to overspending.31 
One example is the Scottish club Glasgow Rangers,32 who were 
                                                                                                             
 26. About UEFA—Overview, supra note 3. 
 27. In European football, the terms tournament, league, and cup are often 
used interchangeably. These tournaments include the Champions League, 
Europa League, and Super Cup. The most lucrative of the tournaments is the 
Champions League, which distributed €904.6 to clubs that competed in the 
2012–2013 tournament. Management Clubs Benefit from Champions League 
Revenue, UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.uefa.org/management/finance/news/newsid=1975196.html [here-
inafter Champions League Revenue]. 
 28. “Facing the prospect of being punished with heavy fines and barred 
from European competition, [football clubs] are desperate to make sure that 
generated revenues are equal or greater than expenditure[s].” Fair Play? 
Football Clubs Seek to Beat Financial Offside Trap, CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/23/sport/football/football-financial-fair-play-
trabzonspor/index.html (last visited May 20, 2013). 
 29. Financial Fair Play, supra note 7. 
 30. See Servette Geneva File for Bankruptcy, FOURFOURTWO.COM (Mar. 1, 
2012, 6:10 PM), http://fourfourtwo.com/news/restofeurope/96534/default.aspx; 
Portsmouth in Administration as Championship Club Face Another Fight for 
Survival, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 17, 2012, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2102526/Portsmouth-
administration.html. 
 31. Such overspending is the result of large transfer fees, which are lump 
sum payments to other clubs to acquire a player and very high salaries of 
players and managers. The Football Debt League—Top 10 Most Indebted 
Clubs, SOCCERLENS.COM, http://soccerlens.com/the-football-debt-league-top-
10-most-indebted-clubs/50035/ (last visited May 20, 2013). 
 32. Unlike American sports, football clubs are often referred to by city and 
team name without the article “the.” For example, the American baseball 
team is called “the Texas Rangers” or “the Rangers,” whereas the Scottish 
football club is just called “Glasgow Rangers” or “Rangers.” See, e.g., Rangers 
Dropped to Lowest League in Scotland, USA TODAY (July 14, 2012, 12:03 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/soccer/story/2012-07-13/glasgow-
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frequent champions of Scottish football.33 The club, founded in 
1873,34 recently declared bankruptcy; and after a vote among 
other teams in the Scottish Premier League, the club was 
forced to begin the 2012–2013 season in the lowest competitive 
tier of professional football in Scotland.35 Although an extreme 
example of a club’s financial collapse, Glasgow Rangers’ bank-
ruptcy demonstrates that even the world’s most popular clubs 
are not immune to the perils of overspending.36 
A. Financial Fair Play Regulations 
Seeking to prevent further instances of insolvency, UEFA’s 
Financial Fair Play regulations require that clubs “‘live within 
their means’ or break even based on football-related income at 
least matching their football-related expenditure[s].” 37  Addi-
tionally, there are several non-financial requirements listed in 
the FFP Regulations.38 For example, a club must show that it 
has “a youth development program, player registration, train-
ing facilities, a general manager, a financial officer, a media 
                                                                                                             
rangers-dropped-to-lowest-league-in-scotland/56212348/1 [hereinafter Rang-
ers Dropped]. 
 33. Rangers have won fifty-four league championships, the most of any 
team in the Scottish Premier League. Id. 
 34. History—Founding Fathers, RANGERS, 
http://www.rangers.co.uk/club/history/club-history/item/499-founding-fathers 
(last visited May 20, 2013). 
 35. Rangers Dropped, supra note 32. 
 36. See, e.g., Shocking DEBTS and Financial Trouble: Rangers, Liverpool, 
Spurs, Leeds and More Big Clubs in Dire Straits, TALKSPORT (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.talksport.co.uk/magazine/features/2012-02-15/shocking-debts-
and-financial-trouble-rangers-liverpool-spurs-leeds-and-more-big-clubs-dire-
straits. Rangers’ insolvency also demonstrates the ripple effect that can occur 
when a club goes bankrupt. Not only are the club’s players, supporters, credi-
tors, and sponsors affected, but the future of the Scottish Premier League as 
a whole could be in jeopardy due to the league’s reliance on the revenue and 
spectacle its top rivalry creates. See Rangers Football Club Enters Admin-
istration, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
scotland-glasgow-west-17026172; Dissolving Scotland’s Old Firm, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/sports/soccer/in-scottish-
soccer-the-rangers-celtic-rivalry-is-rattled-to-its-core.html. 
 37. Platini Wins EC Backing for Financial Fair Play Regulations, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-
and-comment/platini-wins-ec-backing-for-financial-fair-play-regulations-
7580682.html. 
 38. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, arts. 17–18, 20, 
25, 28–40. 
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officer, [and] a supporter liaison officer . . . .”39 If a club does not 
comply with the FFP regulations, UEFA or the club’s national 
association can revoke, or refuse to renew, the club’s license.40 
For most of the larger, more established clubs, compliance 
with the non-financial regulations requires very little change to 
club policies, as it is likely that most of these processes and po-
sitions are either already in place, or would require only minor 
adjustments.41 Therefore, “[t]he [real] challenge for the clubs is 
to fulfill the break-even requirement,”42 even though the regu-
lations account for deviations in clubs’ profits and expenses, 
allowing up to €5 million in losses each year.43 Additionally, the 
regulations allow for excess losses up to €45 million for the 
2013 and 2014 seasons, €30 million for the 2015 through 2018 
seasons, and “a lower amount as decided by . . . the UEFA Ex-
ecutive Committee” 44 in the subsequent years, so long as “the 
excess [losses are] entirely covered from equity participants 
and/or related parties.”45 This allows clubs with wealthy inves-
tors to continue to compete in UEFA competitions notwith-
standing large losses until 2018,46 as long as the investors are 
willing to contribute equity to cover any excess losses beyond 
the permissible deviation of €5 million.47 However, if a club 
does not have the assistance of a wealthy benefactor, or other 
means of quickly generating income, the maximum allowable 
football loss without suspension of the club’s UEFA license is 
€5 million.48 With such staggering sums of money involved, the 
owners, or even players, of a club whose license is revoked are 
likely to challenge the FFP regulations’ compatibility with EU 
free movement or competition law. Regardless of the compel-
ling reasons for Financial Fair Play’s implementation, the ECJ 
                                                                                                             
 39. Ryan Murphy, Playing Fair in the Board Room: An Examination of the 
Corporate Structures of European Football Clubs, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 409, 
414 (2011) (citing UEFA CLUB LICENSING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, arts. 
17–18, 20, 25, 28–40, 35, 36–39). 
 40. UEFA CLUB LICENSING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 14. 
 41. Murphy, supra note 39, at 414. 
 42. Id. 
 43. UEFA CLUB LICENSING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 61. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. After 2018, the maximum deviation allowed will be decided by the 
UEFA Executive Committee. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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would likely find that the regulations are incompatible with the 
Treaty because the FFP regulations do not meet the strict 
standards of the proportionality test developed in EU case law. 
B. The Development of EU Sports Law: From an Exception to a 
Justification 
Over the course of nearly thirty years, the ECJ has recog-
nized that sports are of a unique nature and therefore may 
warrant different treatment than other areas of the law. At 
first, the ECJ considered rules of a purely sporting interest to 
be outside the scope of the treaty, or an exception to the rules.49 
However, as more cases arose, this exception turned into a jus-
tification for restrictions on competition or the free movement 
of workers, subject to the principle of proportionality.50 This 
section will introduce the relevant Treaty provisions and the 
principle of proportionality, outline the development of sports 
law and its application through a discussion of the landmark 
case law, then conclude with recent developments in the EU 
legislature’s specific mention of sport. 
1. The Relevant Treaty Provisions and the Principle of Propor-
tionality 
In order to better understand the development of EU sporting 
case law, a brief introduction of the relevant Treaty provisions 
is warranted.51 Challenges to sports regulations have generally 
been brought under three Treaty provisions. First, many early 
challengers invoked Article 12, which prohibits “any discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality.”52 However, recently this type 
of challenge has given way to free movement challenges under 
Article 45, which dictates “that free movement for workers 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Case 36/74, Walrave v. Ass’n Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 
E.C.R. 1405, para. 4. 
 50. See generally Simon Gardiner & Roger Welch, Bosman—There and 
Back Again: The Legitimacy of Playing Quotas under European Union Sports 
Policy, 17 EUR. L. J. 828, 828 (2011); PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 15, at 
87. 
 51. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 52. See, e.g., Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333; Walrave, 
1974 E.C.R. 1405. 
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shall be secured within the Union.”53 Finally, these challenges 
are often paired with Article 101 challenges, which prohibit “all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States.”54 
To analyze these claims, the ECJ applies the principle of pro-
portionality, a general principle of EU law55 that “requires that 
action undertaken must be proportionate to its objectives.”56 
The principle stems from the legal systems of various member 
states and “[i]ts development as a ground for review can be 
seen as the judiciary’s response to the growth of administrative 
powers and the augmentation of administrative discretion.”57 
The test for proportionality can be broken down into two re-
quirements.58 The first is whether the measure aims to achieve 
a legitimate objective.59 There are many types of legitimate ob-
jectives, but these vary from case to case and often involve 
matters of public interest or public safety.60 The second re-
quirement is whether the measure is necessary and not overly 
restrictive. 61  To determine necessity, the ECJ often asks 
“whether there are other less restrictive means of producing 
the same result.”62 This second requirement, often called the  
least restrictive means test, is what frequently leads to a find-
ing that a regulation is incompatible with the Treaty. 
                                                                                                             
 53. See, e.g., Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Bernard, 2010 
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 113 (Mar. 16, 2010); Case C-415/93, Bosman, 1995 
E.C.R. I-4921; Dona, 1976 E.C.R. 1333; Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405. 
 54. See, e.g., Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921; Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405. 
 55. TRIDIMAS, supra note 17, at 6. 
 56. Id. at 136. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Tridimas describes it as a three-part test, but states that “in practice, 
the [ECJ] does not distinguish in its analysis between the second and third 
test.” Id. at 139. 
 59. Id.; see also Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Bernard, 
2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 113 (Mar. 16, 2010); Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921; 
Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333; Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 
1405. 
 60. TRIDIMAS, supra note 17, at 136. 
 61. Id. at 139. 
 62. Id. 
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2. The Development of EU Sporting Case Law 
In the 1974 case, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste In-
ternationale, the Court ruled on a sport governance matter that 
paved the way for the confusion still present in EU sports law 
today.63 In the case, two cyclists challenged a rule promulgated 
by the Association Union Cycliste Internationale (“UCI” or “Cy-
clist Union”) that required the pacemaker to be of the same na-
tionality as the cyclist.64 The cyclists argued that this practice 
constituted discrimination on grounds of nationality under Ar-
ticle 12 of the Treaty and a restriction of free movement under 
Article 45.65 The Court first stated that “the practice of sport is 
subject to [European] Community law in so far as it constitutes 
an economic activity,”66 then concluded that the “composition of 
. . . national teams . . . has nothing to do with economic activi-
ty.”67 Therefore, the Court found the rules in question did not 
fall within the scope of the discrimination and free movement 
provisions of the Treaty. 68  The Court’s interpretation in 
Walrave created the idea that “pure sporting rules” were re-
moved from the scope of the Treaty, providing sporting organi-
zations with a potential defense to challenges under EU law 
and laying the framework for much of the following thirty-five 
years of EU sporting case law.   
Two years later, in Dona v. Mantero,69 the Italian Football 
Federation (“IFF”) attempted to use this exception to validate a 
set of rules that indirectly70 resulted in only Italian footballers 
being able to participate in professional or non-professional 
                                                                                                             
 63. Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405. 
 64. Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, para. 2. The rule in question stated in 
French “l’entraîneur doit etre de la nationalite de coureur,” which translates 
literally to “the coach must be of the nationality of rider.” Id. The ECJ clari-
fies the phrase idiomatically finding in English it means “[t]he pacemaker 
must be of the same nationality as the stayer.” Id. 
 65. The applicant also included a free movement of services claim, but the 
ECJ analyzed both claims together. Id. 
 66. Id. para. 4. 
 67. Id. para. 8. 
 68. Id. para. 13. 
 69. Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333. 
 70. The rule said that only players who were affiliated with the Italian 
Football Federation could take part in matches, but affiliation to the federa-
tion was only available to Italian nationals. Therefore, only Italian nationals 
could take part in matches. Dona, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, para. 5. 
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matches.71 The Court again spoke of “the possibility that cer-
tain specific rules could constitute ‘purely sporting’ rules that 
were not contrary to the Treaty freedoms and their require-
ment of non-discrimination,”72 but without much explanation, 
found that the IFF’s rules were incompatible with the Treaty.73 
Because the Court failed to elaborate on what type of rules 
could constitute purely sporting rules other than the national 
team selection rules in Walrave, sporting organizations were 
left with little guidance on how to regulate.74 
Nearly thirty years after Walrave, in Union Royal Belge de 
Societes de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman,75 the Court 
drastically narrowed the “pure sporting rules” exception, but 
opened the door to another possible defense for sporting organ-
izations.76  Jean-Marc Bosman was a Belgian football player 
whose contract had expired with RFC Liege, a football club in 
Belgium’s highest division.77 Several other clubs were interest-
ed in signing Bosman, but transfer negotiations between RFC 
Liege and the interested clubs were unsuccessful because RFC 
Liege demanded too high of a price.78 Subsequently, RFC Liege 
refused to let Bosman leave the club and reduced his wages,79 
prompting Bosman to challenge RFC Liege’s transfer practices, 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. 
 72. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 15, at 84. 
 73. Dona, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, para. 2. 
 74. Klause Vieweg, The Legal Autonomy of Sport Organizations and the 
Restrictions of European Law, in PROFESSIONAL SPORT IN THE EU: 
REGULATION AND RE-REGULATION 84, 104 (Simon Gardiner, Richard Parrish, & 
Robert C.R. Siekman eds., 2009). 
 75. Case C-415/93, Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921. 
 76. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 15, at 84. 
 77. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 28. European football leagues are 
set up in different divisions, or tiers, with a promotion and relegation system 
whereby at the end of the season, the clubs that finish in the worst ranking of 
one division are “relegated” to the division immediately below. See discussion 
infra Part II.B. 
 78. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, paras. 28–34. 
 79. Id. para. 29. 
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as well as “the so called 3+2 rule,”80 which limited the number 
of foreign players that each club could have on its roster.81 
Bosman challenged the rules as being incompatible with Ar-
ticle 12, prohibiting discrimination based on nationality; Arti-
cle 45, prohibiting restrictions on the free movement of work-
ers; and Article 101, prohibiting competition distortion. The 
Court did not address Bosman’s challenges under Article 101, 
“perhaps recognizing the difficulties involved with the applica-
tion of competition law to sporting competitions.”82 However, 
the Court did address the challenge under Article 45,83 which 
“entail[s] the abolition of any discrimination based on national-
ity between workers of the Member States as regards employ-
ment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employ-
ment.”84 
The Court again turned to the language of Walrave and Dona 
limiting the scope of the TFEU to sporting regulations that 
constitute economic activities, as defined in the Treaty.85 More 
significantly, the Court added to the rule, stating that “within 
the context of economic sporting activity, [it] recognized a cate-
gory of rules or practices ‘justified on non-economic grounds 
related to the particular nature and context of certain matches’ 
and limited to their proper objectives.”86 This language repre-
sented the Court’s recognition that its definition of pure sport-
ing rules, as formulated in Walrave and Dona, was too narrow 
due to the complex relationship between sport and its economic 
aspects.87 
Turning to the merits of Bosman’s challenge, the Court ruled 
that RFC Liege’s transfer policy was incompatible with Article 
45 as it was “likely to restrict the freedom of movement of play-
ers who wish to pursue their activity in another member 
                                                                                                             
 80. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 15, at 86. “Under the 3+2 rule, teams 
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state.”88 However, such restrictions may still be justified under 
the principle of proportionality, and therefore compatible with 
the Treaty, if the “rules pursued a legitimate aim compatible 
with the Treaty and were justified by pressing reasons of public 
interest.”89 Applying this standard, the Court found that “the 
aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a 
certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players 
must be accepted as legitimate,” meeting the first prong of the 
proportionality test. 90  Next, however, the Court found that 
while the transfer rules in question have such an effect,91 the 
“same aims [could] be achieved at least as efficiently by other 
means.”92 Thus, by not meeting the least restrictive means test, 
the rules did not satisfy the second prong of the proportionality 
test and were therefore incompatible with the Treaty.93 
Similarly, the Court found that the 3+2 rule also placed an 
impermissible restriction on the free movement of workers.94 
The Court first distinguished the rule from the “purely sport-
ing”  national team rules in Walrave and Dona and found that 
the rule “has the effect of reducing the workers’ chances of find-
ing employment.”95 As a justification for the rule, the national 
associations96 argued, inter alia,97 that the rules “help[ed] to 
maintain a competitive balance between clubs by preventing 
the richest clubs from appropriating the services of the best 
players.”98 The Court conceded that maintaining a competitive 
balance could be a legitimate justification, but found that the 
3+2 rule was “not sufficient to achieve [that] aim” because a 
single club could still acquire the best domestic players and 
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 96. The Belgian National Football Association, UEFA, and German, 
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thus undermine the competitive balance. Therefore, the rule 
was not proportional to its objectives.99 
The Bosman ruling had a significant impact on the internal 
structure of sports organizations100 and sparked concerns that 
the Court was interfering with “a whole raft of sectors never 
intended to be subject to supranational governance.”101 Fur-
ther, the analysis showed that sporting interests, such as 
maintaining a competitive balance and recruiting and training 
youth players, could justify a restriction for the purposes of 
proportionality.102 However, by finding that these measures did 
not meet the least restrictive means test without further ex-
planation, the Court again left sports regulators with very little 
guidance as to how they should regulate to achieve their goals. 
Five years after Bosman, in 2000, the ECJ made two rulings 
within two days of each other that had a significant impact on 
EU sports law.103 In the first case, Deliege v. Ligue de Judo,104 
the Court broadened its reach into sports governance and fur-
ther narrowed the Walrave exception by “offer[ing] an expan-
sive interpretation of ‘economic activity.’”105 Deliege involved an 
amateur Judo106 athlete who claimed that a set of European 
Judo Union rules, which restricted the number of participants 
in Judo tournaments on the basis of nationality, were incom-
patible with EU law.107 In finding amateur sport “constitutes 
an economic activity within the meaning of . . . the [Treaty],”108 
the Court offered a broad and complicated interpretation of 
amateurism and its connection with economic activity within 
EU law.109 It essentially said that there are means outside of 
remuneration that bring amateur athletics within the scope of 
economic activity, such as sponsorships, celebrity status, and 
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 100. Parrish, Reconciling Conflicting Approaches, supra note 9, at 29. 
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other grants or aid.110 However, without providing further ex-
planation, “the Court left rather unclear how directly connected 
the economic activity must be for the sporting rule to be capa-
ble of constituting a restriction on the freedom to provide ser-
vices.”111 On the other hand, the Court did make clear “that the 
decisions of national amateur associations could be subject to 
[EU] law even where the sport itself had no direct economic 
dimension and the rule in question was non-discriminatory.”112 
The second case, Lehtonen v. Fédération Royale Belge des So-
ciétés de Basket-ball (Belgian Royal Federation of Basketball 
Clubs - FRBSB),113 involved the player transfer policies of the 
International Basketball Federation (“FIBA”).114 Although the 
transfer rules applied uniformly to all member federations, the 
Court still found “[t]he existence of an obstacle to freedom of 
movement.” 115  Therefore, it had to determine whether “the 
need to prevent distortion of sporting competitions was capable 
of justifying those rules.”116 Though the Court found that the 
measures met the first prong of the proportionality test be-
cause the rules of “setting . . . deadlines for the transfers of 
players may meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of 
sporting competitions,”117 it concluded that the rules went “be-
yond what [was] necessary for achieving the aim pursued.”118 
Therefore, the second prong of the proportionality test was not 
met.119 Again, the Court failed to elaborate on what would be a 
proportional rule, offering no guidance to sporting organiza-
tions as to what would constitute a rule that is proportional to 
its objectives.120 
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By the time the Court reached its decision in Meca-Medina v. 
Commission121 in 2006, EU sports law, while still imperfect and 
disconnected, was “underpinned by identifiable themes which 
define[d] the permitted scope of sports governance.”122 One of 
these themes, the “purely sporting” exception from the scope of 
the Treaty declared in Walrave, was essentially struck down by 
the Court’s decision in Meca-Medina.123 Meca-Medina involved 
a challenge under Articles 45 and 101 by two professional 
swimmers who were banned from competition for two years af-
ter failing a drug test administered by Federation Internatio-
nale de Natation (“FINA”),124 the international governing body 
of professional swimming.125 The Court of First Instance126 in-
terpreted “th[e] anti-doping rules [as] concern[ing] exclusively 
non-economic aspects of sport, designed to preserve ‘noble com-
petition.’”127 The ECJ rejected this notion and interpreted prec-
edent on rules of pure sporting interests very narrowly.128 The 
Court held that if an activity falls under a provision of the 
Treaty, “that activity must satisfy the requirements of those 
provisions,”129 thereby rejecting “the notion that a ‘purely sport-
ing’ rule is of itself apt to escape the scope of application of the 
Treaty.”130 
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court found that “safe-
guard[ing] equal chances for athletes [to compete on level 
terms, without performance enhancing drugs], athletes’ health, 
the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport and ethical 
values in sport” were sufficient justifications to meet the first 
                                                                                                             
 121. Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991. 
 122. Stephen Weatherill, The Influence of EU Law on Sport Governance, in 
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prong of proportionality.131 Next, the Court gave deference to 
FINA’s thresholds for punishment, and in a rare decision, 
found that the rules were not excessive or disproportional.132 
However, it is worth noting that the Court did not apply the 
stringent, least restrictive means test used in prior decisions.133 
It is also important to note that this relaxed standard may in-
dicate that when a case involves something that the Court does 
not approve of, such as using performance-enhancing drugs, it 
is less willing to offer the same fundamental protection. Fur-
ther, Meca-Medina marked the end of the existence of a pure 
sporting exception, leaving only a sporting justification for the 
purposes of the proportionality test.134 
This approach was confirmed in Olympique Lyonaisse SASP 
v. Bernard,135 where the purely sporting exception was not even 
argued.136 Bernard involved another Article 45 challenge to a 
transfer rule, which Olympique Lyonaisse (“Lyon”), a French 
football club, claimed resulted in a restriction on the free 
movement of workers.137 Bernard, a player whose trainee con-
tract138 with Lyon had expired, refused to sign a new contract 
with the club. Instead, he signed a professional contract with 
Newcastle United FC, an English club.139 Lyon then sought 
compensation based on a French rule that said if a professional 
club trained a player between the ages of sixteen and twenty- 
two under a fixed term contract, that player must sign a pro-
fessional contract with that club upon the expiration of the 
trainee contract or the club is entitled to damages.140 The ECJ 
found that such rules “are likely to discourage [a] player from 
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exercising his right of free movement”141 and therefore consti-
tuted a restriction incompatible with the Treaty.142 
The Court then applied the proportionality test. The Court 
reiterated that the special nature of sport gives rise to justifia-
ble reasons of public interest,143 but found that the rules did 
not meet the second prong of the proportionality test.144 The 
Court reasoned that because the rules were based on damages, 
rather than actual compensation for training, they were “not 
necessary to ensure the attainment of [the] objective” of pro-
moting the recruitment and training of young players, again 
showing the difficulties of meeting the second prong of the 
Court’s strict proportionality standard.145 
Thus, having affirmed the elimination of a pure sporting ex-
ception from Meca-Medina, the Bernard Court left only a sport-
ing justification for sporting rules that may implicate a provi-
sion of the Treaty.146 Further, this standard applies to govern-
ance of both professional and amateur sports, due to the vari-
ous ways in which both fall within the Treaty’s definition of 
economic activity.147 Finally, for such a rule or regulation to be 
justifiable, it must meet the strict proportionality standards set 
forth in both Bosman and Lehtonen.148 
C. The White Paper on Sport and the Treaty of Lisbon 
In 2007, the Commission of the European Communities 
(“Commission”) released the White Paper on Sport149 (“White 
Paper”) in order “to give strategic orientation on the role of 
sport in Europe, to encourage debate on specific problems, to 
enhance the visibility of sport in EU policy-making, and to 
raise public awareness of the needs and specificities of the sec-
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tor.”150 After highlighting several reasons why sport plays such 
an important role in society,151 the White Paper discussed “the 
specificity of sport,” emphasizing that the unique characteris-
tics of sport make it subject to certain exemptions, such as or-
ganizational rules establishing separate competitions for men 
and women.152 Then, using similar language to the Court’s pri-
or decisions regarding sport, the White Paper affirmed Meca-
Medina’s rejection of pure sporting rules and said that “the as-
sessment of whether a certain sporting rule is compatible with 
EU competition law can only be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis.”153 This declaration by the Commission not only affirmed 
the end of the pure sporting exception but also reflected the 
legislature’s support for the use of sporting objectives as poten-
tial justifications for Treaty violations.154 
Next, the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force in 2009 marked 
“the first time that sport [was] subject to explicit reference 
within the treaties establishing and governing the European 
Union.”155 However, the “content of the new provisions [were] 
drawn with conspicuous caution,”156 making their “influence on 
sport in Europe both profound and trivial.”157 Article 165(1) of 
the Treaty of Lisbon states that “[t]he Union shall contribute to 
the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking ac-
count of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function.”158 
The treaty’s cautious phrasing has two implications. The first 
implication involves a limited grant of power to govern in the 
field of sports law.159 The Treaty of Lisbon grants the EU three 
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levels of governing power to various fields of law, called compe-
tences.160 The strongest level is “exclusive competence,” which 
gives the EU sole power to “legislate and adopt binding acts in 
[a field].” 161  The second, “shared competence,” allows both 
member states and the EU to legislate.162 The third, “support 
competence,” only gives the EU the power “to support, coordi-
nate or compliment the action of the Member States” and does 
not grant any legislative power.163 Of these three competences, 
Article 165 grants “only a supporting competence for the EU, 
the weakest type of the three.”164 This shows the EU’s hesitan-
cy to get too deeply involved with sport governance. 
Next, and perhaps more importantly in relation to sports law, 
the Treaty’s explicit reference to sport validated the idea that 
the goals of sporting organizations are capable of justifying a 
restriction on competition or of free movement under certain 
circumstances. It also further confirmed the special nature of 
sport, the Commission’s statements from the White Paper, and 
the Court’s general approach to sporting cases.165 
II. A CHALLENGE TO FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY UNDER THE 
CURRENT STANDARD 
UEFA began implementing the Financial Fair Play regula-
tions at the beginning of the 2012–2013 season and has already 
withheld prize money from twenty-three clubs as sanctions for 
noncompliance with the regulations.166 As more clubs feel the 
repercussions of such sanctions, the likelihood of a challenge 
under EU law increases. The most likely challenges to FFP 
would be either under Article 45, as a restriction on the free 
movement of workers, or under Article 101, involving agree-
ments that affect trade. Under the current standard, analysis 
of a challenge is a four-step process. First, the Court must de-
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termine whether the regulations are an economic activity with-
in the meaning of the Treaty.167 Next, the Court determines 
whether the regulations constitute a restriction according to 
each provision in question.168 Third, the Court looks to the reg-
ulation’s aims and determines whether the aims are capable of 
justifying the restriction.169 Finally, the Court asks whether the 
regulations are sufficient to achieve those aims without going 
beyond what is necessary to do so.170 
A. Financial Fair Play as a Restriction on Free Movement and 
Competition 
Applying the current standard of proportionality to FFP, “the 
practice of sport is subject to [EU] law only insofar as it consti-
tutes an economic activity within the meaning . . . [of the] 
Treaty.”171 It is clear from case law that “this applies to the ac-
tivities of professional and semi-professional football players, 
which are in the nature of gainful employment or remunerated 
service.”172 Additionally, although UEFA is based in Switzer-
land, a non-member state, and is governed by Swiss Law, the 
ECJ’s ruling in Bosman shows that “an entity whose practi[c]es 
[infringe] on competition or free movement in the EU comes 
under its jurisdiction and EU law is applicable.”173 
Next, the free movement claim and the competition claim 
must be considered separately to determine whether the prac-
tices in question are compatible with the Treaty. Article 45(1) 
states that “[f]reedom of movement for workers shall be se-
cured within the Union.”174 In the context of sport, challengers 
have invoked two distinct sections of Article 45, Sections 2 and 
3(b). 175  Section 2 prohibits restrictions on the freedom of 
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movement due to discrimination based on nationality176 and 
Section 3(b) prohibits general restrictions on the right to move 
freely within the territory of member states.177 The former type 
of restriction can be dismissed outright because the Financial 
Fair Play regulations apply equally to all clubs, and therefore 
do not discriminate on the basis of nationality, either directly 
or indirectly.178 However, the latter restriction requires deeper 
analysis. 
The Bosman Court stated that all “provisions which preclude 
or deter a national . . . from leaving his country . . . in order to 
exercise his right to freedom of movement . . . constitute an ob-
stacle to [the freedom of movement] . . . even if they apply 
without regard to the nationality.”179 The next question then 
becomes whether the Financial Fair Play regulations preclude 
or deter players from moving freely throughout the Union. Par-
rish and Miettinen refer to the minimum threshold for deter-
rence as a “substantial hindrance.” Referring to the ECJ deci-
sion of Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH,180 they 
state that regulations that present “too uncertain and indirect 
a possibility . . . of hinder[ing] free movement . . . [do] not con-
stitute a restriction.”181 
The effects of Financial Fair Play on players’ ability to move 
freely within the EU exemplify this type of tenuous causal rela-
tionship. Actual or threatened UEFA sanctions on a club for 
noncompliance have multiple consequences. First, the club will 
be less inclined to over-spend, resulting in lower transfer fees 
and lower potential salaries for players. While this may de-
crease the number of clubs willing to spend large sums of mon-
ey on a player, the player will still have several club options, 
including the opportunity to play in another country. Next, if a 
club’s UEFA license is revoked, this will make the club less at-
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tractive to players who want to compete in UEFA competitions. 
However, because of the structure of UEFA competitions, if one 
club is not permitted to participate, another club will take its 
place, maintaining the amount of clubs participating in the 
competitions. Thus, since the FFP regulations would not affect 
a player’s ability to join a club and participate in those compe-
titions, it is unlikely that the ECJ would find that Financial 
Fair Play substantially hinders a player’s right to free move-
ment under Article 45 of the Treaty. 
The next step is to determine whether Financial Fair Play 
constitutes a restriction of competition under Article 101, 
which states that “all agreements between undertakings, deci-
sions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or dis-
tortion of competition within the internal market [are] incom-
patible with the internal market.”182 Therefore, in order to fall 
within the scope of Article 101, UEFA must either be an “un-
dertaking” or an “association of undertakings.”183 Though not 
defined in the Treaty, the ECJ provided a sweeping definition 
of the term in Höfner v. Macroton GmbH,184 where it ruled that 
“every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed” 
constitutes an undertaking.185 Thus, “an organization carrying 
out regulatory functions and economic functions will be subject 
to competition law in so far as its economic functions are con-
cerned.”186 
Based on this broad definition, and the Commission’s White 
Paper, the Court would find that the UEFA’s FFP regulations 
constitute an agreement between undertakings or among an 
association of undertakings. The White Paper “acknowledge[d] 
the usefulness of . . . licensing systems for professional clubs,” 
but expressly stated that “[s]uch systems must be compatible 
with competition . . . provisions.”187 Further, the “White Paper 
listed as undertakings individual athletes performing services, 
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sports clubs carrying out economic activities such as selling 
tickets, broadcasting or advertising rights, and national and 
international sports associations that commercially exploit a 
sports event as capable of constituting undertakings.”188 UEFA 
and its FFP regulations meet both these standards. First, 
UEFA’s FFP regulations fall squarely into this category of li-
censing systems to which the White Paper refers.189 Second, 
UEFA also commercially exploits football by coordinating ticket 
sales, selling advertising, and distributing media rights.190 
Additionally, case law shows that UEFA’s FFP regulations 
constitute an agreement between undertakings or among an 
association of undertakings. In Piau v. Commission,191 the ECJ 
ruled on a challenge to FIFA’s rules governing players’ 
agents.192 To rule on the matter, the Court first had to deter-
mine whether FIFA and its regulations fell within the scope of 
the Treaty.193 The ECJ stated that FIFA was made up of na-
tional associations, and because those associations constitute 
“associations of undertakings . . . by virtue of the economic ac-
tivities that they pursue,” FIFA also “constitutes an association 
of undertakings within the meaning of [the Treaty].”194 Because 
UEFA is made up of the same national associations that the 
Court found determinative in Piau, UEFA is also an undertak-
ing or association of undertakings within EU Law. 195 
The next step in analyzing an Article 101 challenge is to de-
termine whether the Financial Fair Play regulations “have an 
effect on trade between Member States.” 196  Again, the ECJ 
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provided a broad definition of what constitutes an effect on 
trade for this purpose, requiring “only probable foresight of in-
fluence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of 
trade between Member States which can be either detrimental 
or beneficial.”197 Though this also brings agreements that facili-
tate competition within the article’s scope, the “effect[] . . . 
must be ‘appreciable’ to fall within [EU]” law.198 The Commis-
sion provided guidance as to what is appreciable in its notice 
entitled Guidelines on the Effect of Trade Concept Contained in 
Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty199 and stated that “where the par-
ties to an agreement . . . control less than 5% of the relevant 
market and the turnover of the products in question is less 
than €40 million[,] an agreement fails the appreciability test . . 
. .”200 
ECJ case law also dictates that the Court would find that 
FFP regulations have an appreciable effect on trade. In Piau, 
the ECJ looked to the agency fee regulations in question and, 
citing phrases such as “for a fee” and “transfer contract,” con-
cluded that the regulations constituted an economic activity 
and therefore had an effect on trade.201 Similarly, UEFA’s FFP 
regulations contain inherently economic language and their 
effects are far more pervasive than the rules in Piau. For ex-
ample, a club that qualified to participate in the “group 
stage”202 of UEFA’s 2012–2013 Champion’s League received “a 
minimum €8.6 million” in profit,203 while the winner of the 
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tournament, FC Bayern Munich, earned over €55 million in 
prize money. 204  Also included in the FFP’s compensation 
scheme are performance-based bonuses,205 and a market pool 
share that is split amongst the competing clubs.206 With such 
large figures involved, a club that routinely competes in the 
Champions League would suffer immense economic losses if its 
license were revoked for non-compliance. It follows that if the 
ECJ found that the Piau regulations of agency fees constituted 
an effect on trade, it would make a similar finding in regards to 
the compensation scheme of the FFP regulations. 
With respect to the appreciability test, the Commission’s 
guidance on trade effects suggests that UEFA and its FFP reg-
ulations would meet both the 5% relevant market threshold 
and the minimum turnover requirement of €40 million. “Mar-
ket definition is particularly important in the context of [EU 
competition law],”207 and the Court can approach the problem 
in various ways.208 The Piau case offers guidance as to how the 
Court would define UEFA’s market, but ultimately this deter-
mination is made at the Court’s discretion.209 Although decid-
ing the case on other grounds, the Piau Court stated that “the 
market affected by the [player agency] rules in question is a 
market for the provision of services where the buyers are play-
ers and clubs[,] and the sellers are the agents.”210 This notion 
suggests a willingness to “entertain notions of FIFA’s activities 
in the ‘football market,’”211 which would be analogous to the 
market affected by Financial Fair Play. Whether the Court in-
tended to mean the world or the European football market is 
immaterial because, in either case, UEFA’s market share 
would surpass the 5% appreciability threshold.212 Further, with 
UEFA’s top tournament boasting a €904.6 million prize pool, 
the €40 million in turnover requirement is also met. 
                                                                                                             
 204. Id. 
 205. The bonuses consist of €1 million for a win and €500 thousand for a 
draw in the group stage, increasing as the tournament progresses. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 15, at 114. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Case C-171/05P, Piau v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-37, para. 112. 
 211. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 15, at 114. 
 212. Champions League Revenue, supra note 27. 
2014] SPECIFICITY OF SPORT 429 
Finally, after meeting the two threshold requirements, in or-
der to apply Article 101’s analytical framework, the FFP regu-
lations must restrict competition in some way.213 The EU has 
recognized two types of restrictions on competition: those that 
have an object of negatively restricting competition, and those 
that have the effect of negatively restricting competition. 214 
However, incidental restriction from an agreement with a legit-
imate objective might not constitute a restriction of competition 
if that restriction is unavoidable.215 
Financial Fair Play is anomalous in this regard. While the 
regulation’s goal is “to protect the long-term viability and sus-
tainability of European club football,” 216  thereby preserving 
competition conditions, the sanctions for non-compliance pro-
vided by the regulations constitute a restriction on the clubs’ 
ability to participate in the European market for club football. 
The restrictive monetary or licensing sanctions are avoidable in 
that there are alternative means available to achieve the 
preservation of competition.217 Thus, if the monetary or licens-
ing sanctions are avoidable, the restrictions on competition 
caused by them are also avoidable, bringing the Financial Fair 
Play regulations within the scope of Article 101, subject to the 
principle of proportionality. 
B. Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality is recognized as a general 
principle of EU law and is applied across almost all aspects of 
EU governance.218 To be proportional, Financial Fair Play must 
meet two requirements: (1) the regulations must have legiti-
mate goals that are capable of justifying a restriction, and (2) 
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the regulation’s means of achieving those goals must be neces-
sary and not overly burdensome.219 
1. A Test of Legitimacy 
Even when an agreement falls within the scope of Article 
101, it may nonetheless be exempt from the Article if it “con-
tributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or 
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”220 This is the 
case when the “measure [is] appropriate and necessary to 
achieve its objectives,” or proportional to the agreement’s legit-
imate goals.221 Within the context of competition, this frame-
work uses the term “inherency” rather than the “justification” 
terminology applied in the context of free movement challeng-
es.222 This is because rules that contain inherent restrictions 
are not actually considered restrictions under Article 101, 
“whereas . . . justified rules under free movement are within 
the meaning of ‘restriction’” and are considered excused by the 
ECJ due to their legitimate goals.223 However, for the purposes 
of analysis, “[t]he practical differences are limited, since the 
analytical criteria applied to both are similar.”224 Further, alt-
hough the language of Article 101 refers to goods, the ECJ has 
interpreted it to include distribution of services.225 Therefore, 
the next step in analyzing a challenge to Financial Fair Play is 
to determine whether the regulations’ aims justify the re-
striction. 
Although the ECJ often found sporting regulations incompat-
ible with the Treaty, it typically found that the regulation’s 
various goals had the potential to justify the restriction. First, 
in Bosman, the Court found that “the aims of maintaining a 
balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equali-
ty and uncertainty as to results” was a legitimate goal that 
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could justify a restriction.226 This is also one of the main objec-
tives of the Financial Fair Play regulations. By limiting the 
amount of acceptable losses each year, the regulations aim to 
level the playing field between the clubs that have investors 
with seemingly endless amounts of capital and the clubs that 
do not. 
Additionally, in both Bosman and Bernard, the ECJ found 
that “encouraging the recruitment and training of young play-
ers” was also a legitimate goal.227 Financial Fair Play encour-
ages such development. Because the costs associated with 
bringing young players through the club’s internal system are 
significantly lower than bringing established players in 
through transfers, a club struggling to meet Financial Fair 
Play’s break-even requirement would likely invest more in re-
cruitment.228 Further, developing youth players can generate 
more football-related income because as those players develop, 
they can be sold to other clubs, which would raise money for 
bringing new players or improvements to the club.229 
Another justification, which has not been tested before the 
ECJ, stems from the unique nature and structure of European 
football. European football associations operate on a promotion 
and relegation system, meaning that a club’s position in the 
standings at the end of each season determines the level that 
the club will play at in the next season.230 For example, in Eng-
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land’s Premier League (“PL”), the clubs who finish in the bot-
tom three positions are relegated to the Championship, the 
second tier league. 231  Meanwhile, the top two clubs of the 
Championship are automatically promoted to the PL, while the 
third through sixth place clubs compete in a playoff to win the 
third promotion spot.232 To maintain such a system, a consen-
sual interdependence must exist.233 Further, any disturbance to 
this interdependence, like a club’s bankruptcy, will have effects 
that ripple throughout each level of the sport. If a club that was 
about to be relegated collapsed financially, either a club that 
would otherwise not have been relegated would be, or a club 
that would otherwise have been promoted would not be. In ei-
ther case, that club would suffer financial hardship from either 
the loss of income from going down to a lower league, or the 
loss of income that it would have expected from moving up to a 
higher one. By requiring clubs to maintain fiscal responsibility, 
Financial Fair Play seeks to achieve stability and avoid such 
disturbances in football’s internal market. With such justifica-
tions, the ECJ would likely find that Financial Fair Play’s ef-
fects on competition could be justified if proportional to these 
legitimate goals. 
2. A Test of Necessity 
Having met the first burden of proportionality, a legitimate 
objective, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether 
the Financial Fair Play regulations are necessary to achieve 
that goal and not overly burdensome. It is at this stage of the 
analysis that the ECJ has often found that a rule or regulation 
is incompatible with the Treaty. The most notable example of 
this is in Bosman, where the ECJ found that because the objec-
tives of maintaining a competitive balance among the clubs and 
encouraging youth development could “be achieved at least as 
efficiently by other means,” the rules in question were not pro-
portional.234 Similarly, it is likely that the ECJ would find Fi-
nancial Fair Play regulations would not meet this test due to 
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the alternative means available for FFP to accomplish its fiscal 
responsibility goals. One example of an alternative means for 
FFP to achieve its goals is to incentivize fiscally responsible 
club management, rather than punish irresponsibility. In such 
a scheme, a reward could be given to those clubs that achieve 
an adequate financial balance, rather than sanctions for those 
that do not. This scheme could also help clubs that are strug-
gling competitively because a team that has a good financial 
balance would likely spend the reward by purchasing players 
from other clubs, thus putting more “responsible” money into 
the football market. Another alternative could involve UEFA 
representatives acting as advisors to clubs that wish to comply. 
Instead of attempting to break even on its own, a club could 
assent to having a UEFA financial advisor on staff that would 
approve or deny decisions of the club based on its budget. By 
making participation voluntary, such a system would be less 
restrictive and would likely achieve the regulation’s aims just 
as effectively. Because a variety of less restrictive means are 
readily conceivable, Financial Fair Play would likely fail the 
test of necessity. 
The Court in Bosman invalidated the second set of rules in 
question because they were “not sufficient to achieve [the] aim” 
of maintaining a competitive balance. 235  The Financial Fair 
Play regulations are unlikely to meet this high standard. While 
the regulations will encourage many clubs to spend wisely, 
their reach is limited. First, the majority of clubs are unlikely 
to participate in UEFA cups due to the tournaments’ elite na-
ture. For example, for an English club to participate in either 
the Europa League or the Champions League, it must either 
win one of England’s domestic tournaments, or finish in one of 
the top five or six positions in the Premier League, depending 
on a variety of factors.236 Although it is not impossible for a 
lower division club to win one of these tournaments, it is ra-
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re.237 Therefore, most of the clubs in the third or fourth tiers of 
English football would not suffer from having their licenses re-
voked by UEFA, unless the English Football Association en-
forces the revocation too. Because lower division clubs face the 
same problems of overspending, and are less likely to have a 
wealthy investor, the Court would likely find that FFP is not 
sufficient to achieve its goals. 
Another decision where the ECJ invalidated a regulation on 
proportionality grounds was Lehtonen, where it found that the 
rules “went beyond what [was] necessary to achieve the aim 
pursued.”238 Although a similar reason to that in Bosman, this 
language suggests that the means used could pass the Court’s 
test if appropriately scaled back. Applied to Financial Fair 
Play, the ECJ would likely find that the extensive penalties for 
non-compliance go beyond what is necessary to achieve UEFA’s 
goals. For example, the regulations could achieve these means 
without revocation of a club’s license and keep the incentives 
for compliance by merely withholding a portion of a club’s prize 
money. 
Therefore, although UEFA’s goals of ensuring stability of the 
sport, promoting fair competition, and promoting youth devel-
opment through Financial Fair Play are legitimate, the afore-
mentioned factors, combined with the ECJ’s history of finding 
sporting rules incompatible with the Treaty, make it highly un-
likely that FFP would pass the test of proportionality. 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH TO SPORTS-RELATED 
PROPORTIONALITY 
If the Court were to apply a less exacting standard of propor-
tionality in certain areas of law that do not require such strong 
protection, it would allow for the Financial Regulations to 
stand without diluting its doctrinal protection of more funda-
mental rights. Both the ECJ and the European Commission 
have suggested that sports organizations should be granted 
“conditional autonomy” due to sport’s unique needs and struc-
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ture.239 Such autonomy should be conditioned upon “respect for 
the core norms of the Treaty,”240 such as fundamental human 
rights and a free market. While there is no doubt that sporting 
rules and regulations should not restrict an individual’s right 
to free movement and other fundamental rights, there is a 
strong argument “that the paradigm of open and unrestrained 
competition simply does not apply to competitive sport, because 
of the interdependence of sporting clubs and the pronounced 
detrimental effects of market exit.”241 Therefore, with regard to 
sport governance, the ECJ should distinguish between re-
strictions that violate fundamental or core human rights and 
restrictions that violate EU competition law based on market 
efficiency. Once distinguished, the Court should continue to 
apply its exacting standard of proportionality to any regulation 
or rule that restricts fundamental rights, but should apply a 
lower standard to those that do not. This approach will serve to 
give deference to the organizations that are most familiar with 
the unique nature of sport. 
A. Determining What Type of Right Is Involved 
Determining whether a right is fundamental is not always 
simple and should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Addi-
tionally, challenges to sporting rules often come under multiple 
articles of the Treaty, so the Court must evaluate each claim 
individually to determine what rights are involved. However, 
because the ECJ’s normal practice is to evaluate each article 
claim individually in order to determine whether the rule falls 
within the scope of Treaty,242 isolating the individual rights 
does not impose an excessive burden on the Court. 
The development of what constitutes a fundamental right 
stems largely from ECJ case law. The seminal case in this de-
velopment was Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-
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und Vorratsstelle Getreide.243 In Handelsgesellschaft, German 
citizens contended that EU regulations were incompatible with 
certain fundamental rights embodied in the German Constitu-
tion.244 The ECJ found that although its actions need not con-
form to the German Constitution, “respect for fundamental 
rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court.”245 Since this decision, the ECJ has rec-
ognized a wide variety of fundamental rights through case law. 
Further, “there are now express references to their protection 
in the [Treaty] and the [EU] has acquired its own catalogue of 
fundamental rights in the form of the Charter [of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union].”246 While not an exhaustive 
list, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(“Charter”) 247  is divided into six sections: dignity, freedoms, 
equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice.248 The enumer-
ated rights range from the right to marry249 to the right of col-
lective bargaining,250 and the rights to free movement of per-
sons and services are highlighted in the preamble.251 Ultimate-
ly, however, when a right is not expressly mentioned in the 
Charter, it is in the Court’s discretion whether to treat it as a 
fundamental right. 
Under the proposed system, after a determination that a 
right is fundamental, the ECJ’s proportionality analysis would 
remain the same. For example, if the Court determined that a 
regulation created a restriction on an individual’s right to mar-
ry, it would first look to the aims of the rule to see if the re-
striction could be justified. Then, the Court would test the reg-
ulation’s necessity by asking whether there is a less restrictive, 
alternative means to achieving those aims; whether the regula-
tions are sufficient to achieve those aims; and whether the reg-
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ulations go beyond what is necessary to achieve them. By con-
tinuing to apply this “fundamental proportionality” standard, 
the ECJ would be able to preserve the respect for fundamental 
rights that it advocated in Handelsgesellschaft. 
1. Non-fundamental Rights 
The ECJ has not found that every right presented in a chal-
lenge under EU law deserves the same amount of protection. 
For example, in J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. 
Commission of the European Communities,252 the Court distin-
guished the right of a wholesaler to conduct its business from 
the right to make a profit and said that the guarantees afford-
ed to fundamental rights “can in no respect be extended to pro-
tect mere commercial interests or opportunities.”253 In a similar 
case, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,254 the applicant 
argued that regulations allowing the German government to 
deny her a vineyard permit255 infringed on her fundamental 
rights to property256 and freedom to pursue trade.257 The Court 
rejected the applicant’s argument and declined to extend fun-
damental protection to a type of restriction that is commonly 
“known and accepted as lawful . . . in [the] constitutional struc-
ture of all the Member States.”258 
Under the proposed system, if the Court finds that a regula-
tion infringes on a non-fundamental right or rule, instead of 
using the standard applied to fundamental rights, it would ap-
ply a “non-fundamental proportionality” standard that gives 
greater deference to the regulating organization. Using the 
Hauer case as an example, the Court would first ask whether 
the regulations in question are aimed at a legitimate goal. In 
regulating the vineyards in Germany, the government could 
have the goals of soil preservation, protecting public health by 
limiting wine consumption, or stabilizing the wine market, all 
of which would likely be legitimate. The next step would be the 
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same test of necessity, but instead of the least restrictive 
means, sufficiency, and beyond necessity tests, the Court would 
simply ask whether the means chosen could be rationally ex-
pected to advance the intended goals. The Court would likely 
find that the Hauer permit system for vineyards would meet 
this standard and would therefore uphold the regulation. This 
system would give the ECJ the option to defer to regulating 
bodies that may have more adequate knowledge and insight 
into the best means of achieving a goal. It would also alleviate 
the problem of the ECJ having to consider every potential less 
restrictive means, whether realistic or not, to determine 
whether a rule is proportional. Finally, it would allow the ECJ 
to avoid diluting the fundamental rights doctrine when it does 
not consider that the rights involved warrant strict protection. 
B. Financial Fair Play and the New Standard 
Analysis of Financial Fair Play under the new standard 
would likely achieve a different result than under the Court’s 
current standard. The first step, determining whether a re-
striction or violation of the Treaty exists, would remain the 
same. The next step in the new system would be to determine 
what right or rule is being violated. Then, the Court would de-
termine whether each right or rule involved is either a funda-
mental or non-fundamental right. Finally, the Court would ap-
ply the corresponding standard of proportionality to determine 
whether the rule is compatible with EU law. Because of Finan-
cial Fair Play’s legitimate goals and reasonable means of ad-
vancing them, the Court would likely find the regulations ac-
ceptable. 
As discussed above,259 a claim against Financial Fair Play 
would likely come under Articles 45 and 101. However, because 
of the tenuous causal relationship between Financial Fair Play 
and a football player’s ability to move from country to country 
freely, the Court would likely not go any further in its analysis 
of the Article 45 claim of discrimination based on nationality.260 
That leaves only the Article 101 claim and the determination of 
whether the right to free competition would be considered a 
fundamental or non-fundamental right. 
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The likely starting point of the Court’s analysis would be Ar-
ticle 16 of the Charter, which touches on the right to conduct a 
business.261 However, the article merely states that “[t]he free-
dom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law 
and national laws and practices is recognised.”262 Although Ar-
ticle 16 involves the freedom to conduct a business, it does not 
address any aspect of competition. Additionally, the Court 
would likely find that the phrase “in accordance with Commu-
nity law and national laws” does not necessitate conducting a 
business with fiscal responsibility as required by FFP.263 
Unlikely to find the Charter determinative, the Court would 
then look to case law as an indicator of whether unrestrained 
competition is fundamental. Here, the Nold case is particularly 
telling. The applicant in Nold, a wholesaler in the coal and con-
struction materials industries, challenged a regulation that set 
the minimum amount of coal a purchaser must buy per year to 
remain a wholesaler.264 The applicant contended that by set-
ting the minimum at a “quantity which greatly exceed[ed] [the 
business’s] annual sales in [the] sector,”265 the regulation de-
prived the applicant of its “right [to] freely . . . choose and prac-
tice [its] trade or profession.”266 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that such regulations “must be viewed in the 
light of [their] social function.”267 The Court went on to say that 
the applicant’s inability to compete in the market due to the 
regulations represented a “mere commercial interest” that does 
not warrant fundamental protection.268 
The effects of the regulations in Nold are similar to the ef-
fects of Financial Fair Play. First, the regulation is industry 
specific and affects undertakings differently depending on their 
size and profitability. Those affected in Nold were smaller or-
ganizations, which were unable to generate enough sales to 
match the minimum purchase quota. 269  The Financial Fair 
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Play Regulations are likely to affect clubs that are less popular 
and less able to generate football-related income, whether it is 
through merchandise sales, television rights, or player sales. 
Second, the effect of the regulation for the Nold applicant was a 
total ban on the undertaking’s access to the wholesale coal 
market. 270  The effect of the FFP regulations on a non-
complying club is less excessive because it would not ban all 
access to the football market. Instead the sanction would mere-
ly ban access into the UEFA sanctioned competitions, or Euro-
pean football market, allowing the club to continue to partici-
pate in competitions domestically. Therefore, the restraint on 
the free market from FFP regulations would be less pro-
nounced than those in Nold. Third, viewed in light of their so-
cial function, as instructed by the Nold Court, the FFP regula-
tions serve multiple purposes such as maintaining a competi-
tive balance, encouraging youth development, and promoting 
market stabilization. Finally, because a club can still compete 
in other competitions to generate ticket revenue, develop and 
sell players to make a profit, and sell merchandise and media 
rights, the benefits of competing in the UEFA competitions 
represent no more than “a mere commercial interest”—similar 
to the interest seen in Nold. Therefore, taking the totality of 
these factors and the similarity of the effects to Nold, it is un-
likely that the ECJ would find that the Financial Fair Play 
regulations restrict any fundamental rights that warrant such 
stringent protection. 
The final step in the analysis is to determine whether the Fi-
nancial Fair Play regulations can rationally be expected to ad-
vance the goals of maintaining a competitive balance, encour-
age youth development, and promote market stabilization. The 
Court would likely find that the regulation’s sanctions could 
rationally advance each of these goals. Because Financial Fair 
Play would limit clubs from spending from their owners’ per-
sonal finances, the regulations would advance the goal of nar-
rowing the gap between clubs with wealthy benefactors and 
those operating on a modest budget. Next, the regulations will 
cause clubs to seek alternative means of finding players and 
sources of football-related income. Because bringing a player 
through a club’s youth system is a means of achieving both of 
these objectives, it is reasonable to find that Financial Fair 
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Play would advance this goal. Finally, a market exit by a bank-
rupt or financially unstable club would cause a severe disturb-
ance to the football market. By encouraging fiscal awareness 
and responsibility, the regulations would likely lead to fewer 
bankruptcies and therefore promote stability. 
CONCLUSION 
The ECJ’s hesitation to grant sporting organizations exten-
sive powers of self-governance is well founded due to the poten-
tial of abuse that comes with such autonomy. However, because 
of its distinct characteristics, the sports market does not ap-
propriately fit within the EU’s current legal framework. While 
sports governance will never fit perfectly into the framework of 
EU law, the proposed “non-fundamental proportionality” 
standard would allow the Court to defer to organizations’ in-
side knowledge of the sports market. It would do so by granting 
the associations the necessary, but conditional, autonomy that 
they need to efficiently regulate, without diluting principles 
developed to preserve the respect for fundamental rights in the 
EU. 
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